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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
“The Government of the United States has broad, undoubted power over
the subject of immigration and the status of aliens.” Arizona v. United States, 567
U.S. 387, 394 (2012). Exercising that power, Congress has forbidden States to
issue professional licenses to immigrants illegally present in the United States.
See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1621(a), 1621(c)(1)(A). But Congress also lets States opt out of that
ban—States may allow unlawfully present immigrants to obtain professional
licenses “through the enactment of a State law after August 22, 1996, which
affirmatively provides for such eligibility.” Id. § 1621(d).
Petitioners ask this Court to promulgate a rule making undocumented
immigrants eligible for admission to the Utah State Bar. This Court, in turn, has
sought the Utah Attorney General’s Office’s views on whether the Court “may
‘enact[] . . . a state law’ under 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d) permitting membership in the
Utah State Bar for undocumented immigrants; and if so, whether it would be
appropriate for the Court to do so.” Order at 2 (Nov. 19, 2018).
In the Attorney General’s Office’s view, this Court may adopt a rule
allowing undocumented immigrants to become members of the Utah State Bar.
In fact, because this Court has interpreted the Utah Constitution to give it the
exclusive power to regulate Utah State Bar admissions, only this Court has
power under Utah law to enact a lawyer-specific opt-out provision that satisfies
1

section 1621(d). Any attempt by the Utah Legislature to regulate bar admissions
for immigrants—of any legal status—would be invalid as a matter of State law.
Even so, the Court should strongly consider not promulgating an opt-out
rule. At least, it should strongly consider not doing so yet. Immigration questions
raise policy-laden disputes of great political import to many State constituencies.
As the Court itself has acknowledged, resolving such inherently political policy
disputes is not its forte. So to best ensure that this Court—a politically
unaccountable body—sets state policy in a way that accounts for the myriad
competing policy considerations, in these unique circumstances the Court should
follow the Legislature’s lead. It should strongly consider waiting to promulgate
an opt-out rule for aspiring lawyers until the Legislature has first passed opt-out
legislation authorizing undocumented immigrants to obtain the types of
professional licenses that are within the Legislature’s power to regulate.
ARGUMENT
I.

This Court’s Bar-Admission Rules Constitute “Enactment[s] of . . . State
Law” for Purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d).
No one appears to seriously dispute that States satisfy section 1621(d)’s

opt-out requirement when their legislatures pass a statute “affirmatively
provid[ing]” that undocumented immigrants may obtain professional licenses. 8
U.S.C. § 1621(d). But that does not answer the question whether the phrase

2

“enactment of a State law” in section 1621(d) unambiguously makes legislation
the only way States can opt out.
In the Attorney General’s Office’s view, it does not. That text can—and
especially in this context, should—be interpreted to allow Utah to opt out by a
court rule making undocumented immigrants eligible for bar admission.
A.

Section 1621(d)’s phrase “enactment of a State law” does not
unambiguously mean only a statute passed by a legislature.

Statutory construction begins, “as always, with the statutory text.” LeBeau
v. State, 2014 UT 39, ¶ 26, 337 P.3d 254.
On its face, the word “law” in section 1621(d) is not limited to statutes. The
word “law” bears a broad definition. One dictionary contemporaneous with
section 1621(d)’s passage lists 17 definitions for the word “law.” The New
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 1544-45 (5th ed. 1993). An earlier one lists nine
definitions, each containing from one to five subparts. Webster’s Third New Int’l
Dictionary 1279 (1963). And the definition of “law” in the edition of Black’s Law
Dictionary contemporaneous with section 1621(d) spans two pages. Black’s Law
Dictionary 884-85 (6th ed. 1990).
A few examples show this term’s sweeping scope. Law is defined as a
“rule of conduct imposed by secular authority”—specifically, the “body of rules,
whether formally enacted or customary, which a particular State or community
recognizes as governing the actions of its subjects or members and which it may
3

enforce by imposing penalties.” New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary at 1544
(first entry). It is also defined as “a binding custom or practice of a community: a
rule or mode of conduct or action that is prescribed or formally recognized as
binding by a supreme controlling authority or is made obligatory by a sanction
(as an edict, decree, rescript, order, ordinance, statute, resolution, rule, judicial
decision, or usage).” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary at 1279 (first entry).
But it can also mean “[a]ny of the body of individual rules in force in a State or
community”; the “action of the courts, as a means of providing redress of
grievances or enforcing claims”; or “[t]he statute and common law.” New
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary at 1544 (second, fifth, and sixth entries).
Alternatively, law is defined as “[t]hat which is laid down, ordained, or
established. . . . Law, in its generic sense, is a body of rules of action or conduct
prescribed by controlling authority, and having binding legal force.” Black’s Law
Dictionary at 884 (6th ed.). Black’s continues: “The ‘law’ of a state is to be found
in its statutory and constitutional enactments, as interpreted by its courts, and, in
absence of statute law, in rulings of its courts.” Id. But the “word may mean or
embrace: body of principles, standards and rules promulgated by government”;
“administrative agency rules and regulations”; or “judicial decisions, judgments
or decrees.” Id. (citations omitted). Thus “law” plainly comprises statutes, but it
just as plainly is not limited to them.
4

The contextual clues from the rest of section 1621(d)’s text do not
undermine that conclusion. See Olsen v. Eagle Mountain City, 2011 UT 10, ¶ 12, 248
P.3d 465. On the contrary, they buttress it. Congress used the compound noun
“State law” in section 1621(d). And “[a]t least since Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938),” the Supreme Court has “recognized the phrase ‘state law’ to
include common law as well as statutes and regulations.” Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 522 (1992) (plurality op.). “[I]t is a cardinal rule of
statutory construction that, when Congress employs a term of art, it presumably
knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word
in the body of learning from which it is taken.” Air Wisconsin Airlines Corp. v.
Hoeper, 571 U.S. 237, 248 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because in
1996 it had been settled U.S. Supreme Court precedent for nearly 60 years that
the phrase “State law” included a state’s common law, statutes, and regulations,
this Court can presume that Congress borrowed that broader meaning when it
used that compound noun in section 1621(d).
Neither does the term “enactment” in section 1621(d) rebut that
presumption and require reading “State law” to mean only “statute.” Enactment
is defined as “[t]he action of enacting a law; the state or fact of being enacted.”
New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary at 812. It can also mean “[a] thing which
is enacted; an ordinance, a statute,” or “[t]he provisions of a law.” Id.
5

That definition admittedly encompasses both the act of a legislature’s
passing a statute and the statute thus produced. See also Black’s Law Dictionary
at 526 (6th ed.) (defining “Enactment” as “[t]he method or process by which a bill
in the Legislature becomes a law”). But other contemporaneous usages suggest
that “enactment” can also mean lawmaking processes other than a legislature’s
passing a statute—particularly rulemaking processes.
Most relevant, before Congress passed section 1621(d), the United States
Supreme Court repeatedly used the words “enactment” or “enact” to describe
regulatory processes—not legislation—producing non-statutory laws. For
example, the Court pointed to its prior holding that a state bureau of prisons had
created a protected liberty interest for certain prison inmates “by enacting
regulations that ‘used language of an unmistakably mandatory character.’”
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221 (1990) (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S.
460, 471 (1983)). It cited “real-world experience” as the reason “the Postal Service
enacted the regulation at issue” in United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 735
(1990). Justice White once described how the Minnesota commissioner of
corrections “enacted new parole regulations” governing prisoners’ release dates.
Bailey v. Noot, 503 U.S. 952, 952 (1992) (White, J., dissenting from the denial of
certiorari). And in deciding what level of deference to apply to agency action, the
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Court observed that “an agency” may be “empowered to enact legislative rules.”
Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 517 n.13 (1981).
Utah courts use that word the same way. This Court described its
authority under article VIII, section 4 of the Utah Constitution as the “authority
to enact rules of evidence and procedure.” Brown v. Cox, 2017 UT 3, ¶ 17, 387
P.3d 1040. The court of appeals said the Department of Professional Licensing
“enacted the Rule” an appellant had challenged as exceeding DOPL’s authority.
Zen Healing Arts LLC v. Dep’t of Commerce, 2018 UT App 25, ¶ 4, 417 P.3d 629.
And this Court has resolved cases by relying on Black’s Law Dictionary’s
definition of “[p]ositive law” as law that “‘typically consists of enacted law—the
codes, statutes, and regulations that are applied and enforced in the courts.’”
Proulx v. Salt Lake City Recorder, 2013 UT 2, ¶ 9, 297 P.3d 573 (quoting Black’s Law
Dictionary 1280 (9th ed. 2009)). Other examples abound. 1

See, e.g., Ross v. Schackel, 920 P.2d 1159, 1170 (Utah 1996) (Stewart, A.C.J.,
dissenting) (noting “a sheep inspector, as a public officer, was statutorily
authorized to enact regulations and take specific actions to protect the public
health”); Cruz v. Middlekauff Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 909 P.2d 1252, 1260 n.2 (Utah
1996) (Zimmerman, C.J., concurring in the result) (noting that the United States
Department of Transportation “has enacted a regulation requiring” car
manufacturers to install a certain safety feature); Elks Lodge No. 719 (Ogden) & No.
2021 (Moab) v. Dep’t of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 905 P.2d 1189, 1206 (Utah 1995)
(describing the holding of a California case “involving an apartment complex
that enacted a rule prohibiting families with children from leasing apartments”).

1
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In short, “the enactment of a State law” that Congress requires of States as
a precondition to their issuing professional licenses to unlawfully present
immigrants is best read to include not just a statute but also a rule or regulation
that “affirmatively provides for such eligibility.” 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d).
B. Interpreting section 1621(d) to allow opting out only by legislation
would raise grave constitutional questions.
At a minimum, section 1621(d) is ambiguous about whether States can opt
out in ways other than by passing statutes. So the Court can employ additional
tools of statutory construction to discern its meaning. See LeBeau, 2014 UT 39,
¶ 26. In these unique circumstances, the most relevant of those tools is the canon
of constitutional avoidance, which supports interpreting section 1621(d) to allow
Utah to opt out by court rule.
The canon of constitutional avoidance says that courts may “reject[] one of
two plausible constructions of a statute on the ground that it would raise grave
doubts as to its constitutionality.” Utah Dep’t of Transp. v. Carlson, 2014 UT 24,
¶ 23, 332 P.3d 900. This canon “shows proper respect for the legislature, which is
assumed to ‘legislate[] in the light of constitutional limitations.’” Id. (quoting Rust
v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 191 (1991)).
Reading section 1621(d) to prescribe legislation as the only way Utah can
authorize bar admissions for undocumented immigrants would raise serious
anticommandeering concerns. The anticommandeering doctrine “represents the
8

recognition” that Congress lacks “power to issue direct orders to the
governments of the States.” Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct.
1461, 1476 (2018). Congress cannot do so because the States “retained ‘a
residuary and inviolable sovereignty’” when they entered the Union. Id. at 1475
(quoting Federalist No. 39). That inherent sovereignty includes “a State’s
constitutional responsibility for the establishment and operation of its own
government.” Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 648 (1973). Indeed, “[t]hrough
the structure of its government, and the character of those who exercise
government authority, a State defines itself as a sovereign.” Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991); see also City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426
U.S. 668, 672 (1976) (“Under our constitutional assumptions, all power derives
from the people, who can delegate it to representative instruments which they
create.”). This Court has recognized this same “basic premise, upon which all our
government is built”—“the people have the inherent authority to allocate
governmental power in the bodies they establish by law.” Carter v. Lehi City, 2012
UT 2, ¶ 21, 269 P.3d 141.
Interpreting section 1621(d)’s opt-out provision to require an exercise of
state sovereign power by one specific branch of state government—the
legislature—raises grave anticommandeering concerns. To be sure, this
manifestation of anticommandeering differs from those held unconstitutional in
9

Murphy, New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), and Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898 (1997). In those cases, Congress issued express federal commands
requiring state officials to do something. Here, Congress admittedly does not
require state officials (in any governmental branch) to do anything; section
1621(d) lets States chose to opt out or not, as they wish.
But if section 1621(d) is interpreted to make only statutory opt-outs
effective, it becomes a federal command that a State assign specific sovereign
powers to a particular branch of state government. Specifically, reading section
1621(d) that way would make a State’s exercise of its sovereign power over
professional licenses (including bar admissions) invalid unless its legislature
exercised it. It’s hard to think of a more direct federal intrusion on the States’ core
retained sovereign rights recognized in Sugarman, Gregory, City of Eastlake, and
Carter to structure their governments—and assign their sovereign powers—as
they see fit.
And that’s not just a theoretical anticommandeering problem. The people
of Utah have in fact assigned their sovereign power over bar admissions to this
Court. The Utah Constitution gives “[t]he Supreme Court” the power to “govern
the practice of law, including admission to practice law,” “by rule.” Utah Const.
art. VIII, § 4. This Court has interpreted that provision to give the Court
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“plenary” and “exclusive authority to govern the practice of law.” Injured
Workers Ass’n of Utah v. State, 2016 UT 21, ¶¶ 14, 43, 374 P.3d 14.
The upshot? As a matter of state law, any attempt by the Utah Legislature
to satisfy section 1621(d) by passing an opt-out statute for bar admissions would
be a nullity. So reading section 1621(d) to limit a state’s ability to opt out only by
passing a statute constitutes an actual, concrete affront to Utah’s sovereignty—a
congressional conclusion that Utah has misallocated its sovereign powers. That’s
at least as constitutionally offensive as Congress’s “issu[ing] direct orders to state
legislatures” that those legislatures theoretically could carry out. Murphy, 138 S.
Ct. at 1478. It might be even more problematic—it’s Congress requiring a state
legislature to exercise a state power that the State has by sovereign right
determined should be vested in another part of its government.
Given section 1621(d)’s ambiguity, this Court should rely on the canon of
constitutional avoidance to conclude that the Court may satisfy section 1621(d)’s
opt-out provision by enacting the proposed rule. 2

Some amici have argued that bar admissions in Utah are not subject to section
1621(a)’s ban because, they contend, in Utah a bar license is neither provided by
a state agency nor funded by appropriated state funds. See, e.g., Br. of Amicus
Curiae Parr Brown Gee & Loveless, P.C. at 3-7 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1621(c)(1)(A)); Br.
of Amici Curiae Ad Hoc Coalition of Utah Law Professors at 7-15 (same).
Nationally, courts are reassessing whether compelled membership in, or funding
of, private entities such as bar associations is consonant with the First
Amendment. See, e.g., Fleck v. Wetch, 139 S. Ct. 590 (2018) (granting certiorari,
vacating the judgment in 868 F.3d 652, and remanding the case to the Eighth

2
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II.

Because the Petition Is Inextricably Linked to a Deeply Political Issue,
the Court Should Strongly Consider Not Enacting an Opt-Out Rule for
Bar Admissions Until the Legislature Passes Opt-Out Legislation for
Other Professional Licenses.
Though this Court can enact an opt-out rule that would satisfy section

1621(d), the more appropriate course in these unique circumstances would be to
follow the Legislature’s policy lead. The Court should strongly consider
adopting an opt-out rule for bar admissions only after the Legislature has passed
a statute allowing undocumented immigrants to obtain other professional
licenses. That conclusion follows from three straightforward premises.
First, when it enacts rules for bar admission, this Court makes policy. Baradmission rules are “rules of general applicability” for aspiring lawyers and
involve “the ‘weighing of broad, competing policy considerations’”—the two
“chief hallmarks of legislative action.” Krejci v. City of Saratoga Springs, 2013 UT
74, ¶ 31, 322 P.3d 662. To be sure, the constitution assigns this limited
policymaking function to the Court. But in that role the Court deviates sharply

Circuit for it to consider—in light of Janus v. State, Cty., & Municipal Employees,
138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018)—the petitioner’s arguments that mandatory membership in
a state bar association, and state bar’s opt-out funding rule, violate the First
Amendment). To avoid inadvertently implicating those separate constitutional
questions, this Court may wish to assume without deciding that Utah bar
licenses are subject to section 1621(a)’s ban—particularly since the Attorney
General’s Office’s analysis and amici’s approach reach the same conclusion on the
Court’s first question.
12

from its usual role of “interpreting the policy decisions of the legislature—not on
making [policy] decisions in the first place.” Carter, 2012 UT 2, ¶ 50.
Second, as the Court itself has long acknowledged, the Court is not well
equipped to tackle divisive policy questions. “‘As a general rule, making social
policy is a job for the Legislature, not the courts.’” Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 20,
¶ 34, 154 P.3d 808 (quoting Van v. Zahorik, 597 N.W.2d 15, 18 (Mich. 1999)).
Indeed, the Court has been “‘especially’” reluctant to make policy “‘when the
determination or resolution requires placing a premium on one societal interest
at the expense of another.’” Id. (quoting Van, 597 N.W.2d at 18). “Courts are illsuited for such ventures” because they “are unable to fully investigate the
ramifications of social policies and cannot gauge or build the public consensus
necessary to effectively implement them.” Id. ¶ 36. The Court thus protects its
institutional credibility and legitimacy through actions recognizing that “‘[t]he
responsibility for drawing lines in a society as complex as ours—of identifying
priorities, weighing the relevant considerations and choosing between
competing alternatives—is the Legislature’s, not the judiciary’s.’” Id. ¶ 34
(quoting Van, 597 N.W.2d at 18).
Third, this particular policy issue—immigration—is a uniquely hot-button
political topic. The constant drumbeat of immigration-related news stories

13

reflects how squarely this issue remains fixed in our national conversation. 3 Even
more to the point, immigration policy remain unsettled in Utah. Just last week,
the Salt Lake Tribune reported on local efforts “to reaffirm” immigration policies
that, in their proponents’ view, “emphasiz[ed] humane treatment of immigrants,
keeping families together and focusing deportation on serious criminals.” Lee
Davidson, Officials reaffirm family-friendly Utah Compact on immigration. LDS
Church still backs it but again doesn’t sign it., Salt Lake Trib. (Mar. 21, 2019),
https://www.sltrib.com/news/politics/2019/03/21/officials-reaffirm-family/.
One participant said that “‘our immigration system is still in need of significant
reform.’” Id. The proponents reemphasized their principles to push those reforms
their way because “[i]mmigration debates remain bitter.” Id.
And that’s precisely the point. The policy debates about immigration differ
in kind from policy debates about, say, what the bar examination should consist
of, see Rule 14-710, or who should be admitted to the Utah State Bar by motion,
see Rule 14-705. Those latter issues command significantly less cognizance. So the

See, e.g., Nick Miroff, ‘The Conveyor Belt’: U.S. officials say massive smuggling effort
is speeding immigrants to—and across—the southern border,
Wash. Post (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/theconveyor-belt-us-officials-say-massive-smuggling-effort-is-speeding-immigrantsto--and-across--the-southern-border/2019/03/15/940bf860-4022-11e9-a0d31210e58a94cf_story.html; Julia Ainsley, February had highest total of undocumented
immigrants crossing U.S. border in 12 years, NBC News (Mar. 5, 2019, 2:37 p.m.),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/amp/ncna979546.
3
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Court’s policy experience or expertise on those questions does not necessarily
transfer to immigration policy debates that remain unresolved despite more than
a decade of effort from Utah’s political branches.
To highlight this ongoing national and local debate is not to take a side in
it. Rather, it is to reiterate what the U.S. Supreme Court has already said:
“Immigration policy shapes the destiny of the Nation.” Arizona, 567 U.S. at 415.
And “the sound exercise of national power over immigration depends on the
Nation’s meeting its responsibility to base its laws on a political will informed by
searching, thoughtful, rational civic discourse.” Id. at 416.
But if this Court unilaterally opts out of section 1621(d) now by enacting a
rule authorizing bar admission for undocumented immigrants, the Court will be
taking an unavoidably political stance on a hot-button policy question before the
Legislature has manifested the state’s “political will” on it. Id. The Court could
do so, but that would disregard the wisdom behind the Court’s prior
acknowledgement that this body is ill suited to “draw[] lines in a society as
complex as ours.” Jones, 2007 UT 20, ¶ 34 (internal quotation marks omitted). The
proposed rule necessarily “plac[es] a premium on one societal interest at the
expense of another,” id. (internal quotation marks omitted)—despite this Court’s
being “unable to fully investigate the ramifications of [this] social polic[y]” or
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“gauge or build the public consensus necessary to effectively implement” it, id.
¶ 36.
The Attorney General’s Office emphasizes that it takes no position on
whether the proposed rule is a good or bad idea. It does not do so because the
Legislature—not this Office—is best suited to declare the State’s “political will,”
after a “searching, thoughtful, rational civic discourse,” Arizona, 567 U.S. at 416,
about whether undocumented immigrants should be eligible for professional
licenses in Utah. In other words, this Office and this Court share the same
institutional and structural deficiencies for resolving these types of inherently
political questions “upon which there is no broad consensus.” Jones, 2007 UT 20,
¶ 38. Institutional modesty thus counsels in favor of deference to the Legislature
on this important question. 4

To the best of the Office’s knowledge, the part of the Utah Code most relevant
to this question is section 63G-12-402. That section requires state agencies to
“verify the lawful presence” of an applicant for “a state or local public benefit as
defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1621.” Utah Code § 63G-12-402(1)(a)(i). Among the few
exceptions to that rule, see id. § 63G-12-402(3), only subsection 402(3)(g) appears
to speak to a professional license—specifically, a securities license—and even
then the exception applies only to applicants who have “registered with the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority,” id. § 63G-12-402(3)(g)(i). So as a whole,
subsection 402(3)’s exceptions do not appear to constitute the sort of
“affirmative[]” general legislative endorsement of professional licenses for
undocumented immigrants, 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d), that might make enacting a baradmissions rule appropriate now. Cf. Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 4-111(3)(b), 4-111(3)(e)
(expressly invoking “the authority provided in 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d)” to prescribe
when undocumented immigrants may obtain any “professional or commercial
license”).
4
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CONCLUSION
This Court may enact a rule that satisfies 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d) and allows
undocumented immigrants to become members of the Utah State Bar. But given
undisputed political realities, it should strongly consider not doing so until the
Legislature has first passed a statute making undocumented immigrants
generally eligible to obtain the types of professional licenses that are within the
Legislature’s power to regulate.
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s/ Tyler R. Green
Tyler R. Green
Solicitor General
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Deputy Solicitor General
Sean D. Reyes
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